#### An eCommerce Perspective on Carbon Trading

Roger Clarke, Xamax Consultancy, Canberra Visiting Professor in eCommerce at Uni of Hong Kong, Cyberspace Law & Policy at U.N.S.W., Computer Science at A.N.U.

> http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/... ... / EC/CT08-HK {.html, .ppt}

eCom/iCom Uni. of Hong Kong – 6 November 2008

2008











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http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/review en.htm







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


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#### **Relative Importance of the Greenhouse Gasses**

Table 2.1 Kyoto Protocol gases—global warming potential			
Kyoto gases	Global warming potentials		
Carbon dioxide (CO <sub>2</sub> )	1		
$Methane (CH_s)$	21		
Nitrous oxide (N <sub>2</sub> O)	310		
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF $_{\!\scriptscriptstyle 6})$	23,900		
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)	140-11,700		
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)	6,500-9,200		
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Second Assessment Report: The Science of Climate Change			

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## **Relative Importance of the Greenhouse Gasses**

Gas	Preindustrial Level	Current Level	Increase since 1750	Radiative forcing (W/m²)
Carbon dioxide	280 ppm	384ppm	104 ppm	1.46
Methane	700 ppb	1,745 ppb	1,045 ppb	0.48
Nitrous oxide	270 ppb	314 ppb	44 ppb	0.15
CFC-12	0	533 ppt	533 ppt	0.17


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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenhouse gases

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#### The Activities That Generate GHG Emissions



**National GHG Emissions Estimates** 2000 and 2050

Country	Per cent of global emissions in 2000	Per cent of global emissions in 2050
US	20.6%	15.1%
China	14.7%	22.9%
EU25	14.0%	7.8%
Russia	5.7%	2.8%
India	5.6%	9.2%
Japan	3.9%	1.8%
Brazil	2.5%	2.2%
Canada	2.0%	1.3%
Republic of Korea	1.5%	1.0%
Mexico	1.5%	1.7%
Indonesia	1.5%	2.2%
Australia	1.5%	1.0%
South Africa	1.2%	1.1%
Rest of the world	23.8%	29.9%

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#### **Alarm Bells**

- The Kyoto Protocol 1992, 1997, 2005, 2009
- Al Gore's 'An Inconvenient Truth' 2006
- The Stern Report 2007

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### Why Not Regulation?

- Conventional Regulation is difficult:
  - Transnationality
  - **Jurisdictional Arbitrage**
  - Polluters are big, and have considerable lobbying power



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# Why a Market?

- The Capitalist's Solution Markets Are Good Because 'greed is good' Because it greases the wheels of the economy [but uncontrolled greed has, yet again, been discovered to be bad for our health]
- The Economist's Rationale Efficient Intervention:

A market in tradable instruments enables polluters to:

- reduce their pollution (if they can do it cheaply enough); OR
- buy tradable instruments from other sources (if other polluters can reduce their own pollution more cheaply)

## The Kyoto Protocol

- An International Agreement
- **Establishes Commitments** by (almost) all Industrialised Nations to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
- Involves Developing Nations
- Provides a Framework for 'Carbon Trading'



## **How Kyoto Facilitates Carbon Trading**

#### Each industrialised country:

- sets a 'cap' on emissions
- creates 'permits' equal to its 'cap'
- requires organisations to meet their target within the 'cap'

#### Polluting organisations comply by:

- using 'allowances' (gratis permits) and/or
- buying permits from the government

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- reducing their emissions, and selling excess permits
- buying permits from someone else
- buving credits

#### Credits arise from emission reduction projects:

- in industrialised countries (often expensive)
- in developing countries (often inexpensive)

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Marketspaces and Marketspace Actors


Relevant Elements of

eCommerce Theory

- Characteristics of Viable Markets
- Tradable Items
- How to Achieve Market Depth
- Price-Setting / Trading Mechanisms



## Marketspace and Marketspace Actors



**Sellers**/Buyers **Tradable Items Buyers**/Sellers Marketspace Operator(s) Agents Agents Service Providers

> **Business Processes** Infrastructure

**Sufficient Scale:** 

Quantity of Tradable Items

**Obligation Enforcement** 

**Characteristics of Viable Markets** 

Credible Tradable Items

**Obligations** 

Transferability

- Sellers, Buyers, Turnover
- A Suitable Market Mechanism
- Coherence and Comprehensibility
- Robustness





#### Credible Tradable Items for Carbon Markets

- The Commodities
  - Permits (disincentive to pollution)
  - Credits (incentive to solutions)



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## How to Achieve 'Market Depth' i.e. enough Items, Buyers and Sellers

- Tradeability
  - A Common Denominator (tonnes of C0<sub>2</sub>-e)
  - Transferability
  - Guarantee of Substance
- 'Bankability'
  - Flexibility as to the time of surrender
- **Derivatives** 
  - Freedom to construct deals



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#### Credible Tradable Items for Carbon Markets

- The Underlying Commodities
  - Permits (disincentive to pollution)
  - Credits (incentive to solutions)
- Derivatives
  - **Futures** (the right and obligation to deliver a specified amount, at a specified price, on a specified date)
  - Options (the right, but not obligation, to buy ('call') or sell ('put') a specified amount, at a specified ('strike') price, during a specified period of time
  - Complex or 'Structured' Derivatives

# **Trading / Price-Setting Mechanisms**

- Sellers' Markets:
  - Catalogue-Sale / List-Price Sale
  - Auction (of many kinds)
- Buyers' Markets:
  - RFO (Sealed First-Price Auction)
  - RFT (Tender) / EOI-RFP (Proposal)
  - 'Reverse Auction'
- **Balanced Markets:** 
  - Negotiation Processes
  - Two-Sided Offers with Matching aka Clearinghouse Auction or Exchange







### **Common Categories of Auction**

- Sellers' Markets:
  - **English Auction / Open Ascending Price Auction** price runs up, bids may be open or sealed, excitement built in, possible 'reserve price', last bidder wins, various price-determination models
  - **Dutch Auction / Open Descending Price Auction** price runs down, first bid wins, forces a motivated buyer to bid early and high
- **Balanced Markets:** 
  - Clearinghouse Auction / Exchange both sellers and buyers submit offers, offers are 'matched', may be continuous or periodic



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auction http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exchange\_(organized\_market)

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#### eCommerce Practice The Tradable Items

- Initial Sale of Permits
- Trading of:
  - Permits (Kyoto)
  - Credits (Kyoto)
  - Offsets (Voluntary)
  - Derivatives



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# **Kyoto-Compliant Tradable Items**

- **Permits**, which may be:
  - granted as 'allowances' especially initially (Assigned Allocation Units – **AAUs**)
  - or sold by the government on the open market
  - and may be for a specific year, for any one year after a specific year, or for any one year at all
- **Credits**, from emission reduction projects:
  - Unit Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) Joint Implementation (JI), in industrialised countries
  - Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in developing countries

### **Current Carbon Markets**

- Precursors to Carbon Markets
  - US sulphur dioxide permits
  - US and European electricity and gas markets
- **Carbon Markets** 
  - EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
  - Smaller ETS in other countries esp. NZ (now), Australia (2010), Canada
  - the 'Voluntary' approach, esp. US, also Japan, and in regions of USA, States of Australia







## How To Sell Permits – Alternative Approaches

- Single-round bidding ('sealed-bid'), or multi-round bidding (auction)
- If an auction, then alternative approaches include:
  - price starts low (ascending), or high (descending)
  - one bidder at a time (open outcry), or all bidders at once (timed-round)
  - bids are the price, or the quantity at a declared price
  - if the bid is a price, the winners pays the last or highest bid, their own bid, or the second-last bid
  - if the bid is a price, the winner may take the lot, or as much as they want, leaving the remainder



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# Case Study of a Permit Sales Mechanism An 'Ascending Clock Auction'

- As used for the sale of Australian Treasury Bonds
- The auctioneer announces a (low) starting price
- Bidders make (open) bids for a quantity at that price
- If the total amount bid for is less than the total available
  - Bidders have bought that quantity, at that price
- Otherwise, iteratively until the total amount bid for is equal to or less than the total available:
  - The auctioneer raises the price
  - Bidders make (open) bids for a quantity at that price
- Bidders have bought, at the price set applicable in the previous round, the quantity that they bid for in this round



http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/ 98eer-ascending-auctions.pdf

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
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#### 'Ascending Clock Auction' **Positive Features**

- May provide some information about demand, and hence may enable informed bidding, and may result in a price that reflects the current supply-demand balance
- Can prevent market manipulation, by including reserve prices, and minimum and maximum parcel-sizes
- Can be sealed-bid with disclosure at the end of each round of either all bids, or only the aggregate quantity of all bids
- Can be used for multiple simultaneous auctions of related tradable items (e.g. Permits for earliest use in 2009, 2010)
- Tends to maximise the price (i.e. a Sellers' Market)

# 'Ascending Clock Auction' **Negative Features**

- It's designed for 'big players', and hence deters small ones (although a, say 10%, price preference could change that)
- It assumes deep demand and strong competition which is unlikely to be the case, especially initially
- During the foundation period at least, price maximisation is <u>not</u> the main aim, but rather:
  - placement of a sufficient quantity, to enable the emergence of a market for permits, and sufficient volume to support derivatives
  - visibility of a price at the outset and at all times (i.e. avoid holding the items back until later)







# **Current Carbon Markets Some Reality Checks**

- EU ETS Phase 1 2005-07 was:
  - a success (trading occurred)
  - a failure (price collapse due to gratis permits, and over-issuance of them)
- US schemes are:
  - a failure (small volumes)
  - a success (standards for tradable items)
- 95% of trading has been in derivatives
- Free-marketeers say government-driven schemes will be and/or should be supplanted by an industry-driven scheme based on 'carbon offsets'




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# **An eCommerce Perspective** on Carbon Trading



# Recapitulation



- Why Carbon Trading?
- **Tradable Items**
- eCommerce Theory
- eCommerce Practice

# **eCommerce Opportunities** for Hong Kong

- **Initial Sale of Permits**
- Trading of:
  - Permits (Kyoto)
  - Credits (Kyoto) esp. Chinese CERs
  - Offsets (Voluntary)
  - Derivatives
- East Asian Partner to US and Euro Exchanges





